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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
Charging Party. 
#2A-2/12/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JANIS LEVART BARQUIST, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
STUART A. ROSENFELDT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of David Kahn to 
a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge that the 
New York State Public Employees Federation (PEF) did not give 
him adequate notice of its agency shop fee. refund procedure. 
PEF printed a notice of this procedure in its eight-page tabloid-
sized newsletter .which-is sent- to .all unit .employees-.. - The. notice 
appeared; on: page .5 in large, bold-face letters under.-the •heading 
.'-'.Policy on-Agency Fee--Dues Refund". 
Although Kahn received the newsletter, he did not open it, 
but followed his normal practice of throwing out all communications 
from PEF, unread.— He regards the newsletter as a propaganda 
organ of PEF which he is not required to read. In his first 
amended charge, he asserted that the only adequate notice would be 
an individual certified letter with a contents notation on the 
—PEF offered to accept a late filing of-a refund application from 
Kahn when he told them that he had not read the newsletter, but 
he declined the offer. 
Board - U-4767 -2 
^ outside of the envelope.' 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge on the ground that 
the notice actually provided-was not unreasonable. In his excep-
tions to the dismissal, Kahn argues that inasmuch as PEF requires 
the filing of a demand for refund to be by certified mail, it is 
not unreasonable for it to be required to use the same procedure 
: in-n^tl"fying ageTTc^shirp^^fee^^payers^about- -the refund-procedure" 
He further argues that there is no legitimate state or union 
interest in requiring agency shop fee payers to read the PEF news-
letter as a condition for receiving a refund and that such a 
requirement compels him to participate in the affairs of PEF. 
Thus, the exceptions present the question whether the inclusion 
of a notice of an agency shop fee refund procedure in an inside 
) page of a union newsletter that is sent to all unit members 
including agency shop fee payers constitutes sufficient notice to 
2 • 
agency fee payers as required by Section 208.3 of the Taylor Law—' 
A person who chooses not to become a member of a union, but 
is required to pay an agency shop fee may be regarded as having 
little interest in reports of the daily affairs of the union. It 
would be unreasonable to expect such a person, in the normal 
course, to read the union newsletter if he is given no indication 
at first glance that it contains material of particular interest 
to him. The heading "Policy on Agency Fee--Dues Refund" would 
have been sufficient to notify Kahn, or any person, paying an ,. 
agency shop fee to PEF, that the newsletter contained material of 
27 " 
—Among other things, Kahn supports his position with a constitu-
tional argument based upon, his reading of Mullane v. Central 
Hanover -Bank and Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) . As we 
find merit to the charge on other grounds, it is unnecessary 
for us to discuss the constitutional issues. 
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particular interest to him had that heading appeared conspicuously 
on the face of the newsletter. Without such a conspicuous means 
of arousing his attention, the inclusion of the notice in PEF's 
newsletter was not sufficient compliance with its §208.3 obliga-
tion. 
zWe—r-e:fe:et—Ka:hn^ s~c;oniention=tha;t— 
to notify unit employees who pay an agency shop fee of its refund 
procedure. Our acceptance of certified mail as a reasonable • > 
method when required by a union for the filing of refund demands 
does not mean that we deem it a necessary method for notification 
to employees of the refund procedure. What is required is that 
PEF's notification of its agency shop refund procedure is likely 
to be read by persons who pay an agency shop fee, A conspicuous 
informative heading on the cover of any notice sent to such 
persons by regular mail is sufficient to make it likely that 
' 3 / they will read it.—'
 ( 
Accordingly, we determine that ; PEF violated §209-a,2(a) of 
the Taylor Law in that it communicated- its' agency shop refund 
procedure to persons paying an agency shop fee merely by 
providing a notice on an"inside page of its newsletter, and 
— : ; • ) 
3/ See UUP and Eson, 11 KERB <[3'074 (1978) at p. 3114 where we 
approved a revised refund procedure and required that notice 
of it be given by regular mail. 
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WE ORDER the Public Employees Federation 
1. to accept a late filing from Kahn for the 1979-
1980 fiscal year;-/ 
2. for the 1981-1982 fiscal year, and for all 
subsequent fiscal years, to provide timely 
notice of its refund procedure to all persons 
paying an agency ~shop~T:ee~"by a malTihg whTclT 
contains a conspicuous identification of the 
notice on its face. 
DATED: February .10, 1982 
Albany, New York 
n^feg^ 
ty&*du kztejjLA*' 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David 
4/ We note that it has already offered to do so and that Kahn has 
refused that offer. His rejection does not constitute a waiver 
to have a late filing accepted because he might reasonably have 
believed that he could not have accepted the offer without 
yielding ::his right to prosecute the improper practice charge 
herein. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-2/12/82 
In the Matter of 
BOCES III, SUFFOLK COUNTY, BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
Employer, 
-and-
BOCES III FACULTY ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, : 
Petitioner. 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG & GROSS, ESO., 
(JOHN H. GROSS, ESQ;, of Counsel), for 
Employer 
MARTIN FEINBERG, for Petitioner 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of BOCES III, 
Suffolk County (BOCES) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that con-
tinuing education instructors employed by BOCES constitute an 
appropriate negotiating unit. The basis of the Director's 
decision was his conclusion that the continuing education 
instructors are public employees but that they do not share 
a community of interest with the teachers who teach in BOCES' 
primary educational program. The Director found that the con-
tinuing education instructors and BOCES' regular teachers teach 
in separate educational programs catering to distinct student 
bodies but that they have different terms and conditions of, and 
qualifications for, employment. There have been no exceptions 
to these findings or to the Director's conclusion that the two 
1 
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groups of teachers do not share a community of interest. 
In support of its exceptions, BOCES argues that the Director 
erred in not concluding that the continuing education instructors 
are casual employees who lack the regular and continuing employ-
ment relationship required for public employee status under 
—^Q^l^y^^-f^trh^^ 
few hours a week for a period of time that is less than a school 
year. 
The test for ascertaining whether employees who do not work 
a full year have a sufficient relationship to their public em-
ployer for public employee status under §201.7 of the Taylor Law 
was first articulated in State of New York, 5 PERB 113022 (1972) 
which dealt with seasonal employment. It is a three-part test: 
such public employment is covered by the Taylor Law if the em-
ployees in an occupational title work at least six weeks a year, 
at least 20 hours a week and at least 60% of them return for at 
least two successive years. This rule has been consistently 
applied for the last ten years. The only exception to it is the 
recognition expressed by the Board in State of New York, supra, 
that the 20-hour-a-week requirement "might not apply to teachers, 
especially in institutions of higher education." 
The record before us shows that the average continuing edu-
cation instructor is employed by BOCES to work 26 days a year over 
a 26-week period,— During that time, most continuing education 
—' BOCES offers its continuing education program for 130 days over 
two 13-week periods. Two-thirds of the continuing education 
instructors teach during both semesters, one day each week. 
, 7319 
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instructors work 3 1/2 hours, a week. Of the 115 continuing edu-
cation instructors who worked for BOCES in the 1977-78 school 
year, 72 returned the following school year for a return rate of 
62%. The return rate for the following two years was 60% and 
64% respectively. 
The test.specified in State of New York, supra, which was 
developed for seasonal employment, is not directly applicable to 
the case before us. It is, nevertheless, a useful starting place 
for our analysis. Applying it, we conclude that the work per-
formed by the continuing education instructors for BOCES meets 
the first and third parts of the test. However, it may not meet 
the second part dealing with hours of work. Although we recog-
nized from the beginning that the normal 20-hour-per-week work 
requirement might not apply to teachers, we have never had an 
occasion to consider how much less time teachers may work each 
week and still be deemed employees within the meaning of §201.7 
of the Taylor Law. 
We need not decide whether, standing alone, teachers who 
work only 3 1/2 hours a week are casual employees and thereby 
excluded from Taylor Law coverage. There are additional factors 
here that compel that exclusion. This is so even though the 
Taylor Law covers all-year employees who may work a shorter work-
week than is required for the coverage of seasonal employees. 
The significant factors before us are that continuing education 
instructors do not teach in the primary educational program of 
BOCES; that they teach only 3 1/2 hours a week in schools other 
than institutions of higher education; and that they teach only 
on one-fifth of the days when school is in session. This is •.".. 
; 732© 
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insufficient to establish the regular and continuing employment 
relationship required for public employee status under the Taylor 
Law. 
In concluding that the continuing education instructors em-
ployed by BOCES are casual employees who are not covered by the 
-Taylor -Law,--we—r^ eco-giii^ .e-JA 
3 1/2 hours a week and that some do work more than 26 days a 
year. However, as indicated in State of New York, 5 PERB 1f3039 
(1972) at page 3068, ,r[T]he test which we Impos^ e relates to the 
occupational title, rather than to individual employees." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the decision of the Director, 
and 
WE ORDER that the petition herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED, Albany, New York 
February 12, 1982 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/tJ£c*^d 
Ida Klaus, Member 
bLMj* 
David C. Randies , 
a^L, 
Membe^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF LACKAWANNA,-
Respondent, 
-and-
AFFILIATED LOCAL 450, 
Charging Party. 
NORMAN A. LeBLANC, JR., ESQ., for Respondent 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Lackawanna (City) to a hearing officer's decision that it violated 
its duty to negotiate in good faith with Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, and its affiliated Local 450 (AFSCME) by unil-ateraliy,. suhc:on-
trae'ting 'its-' 'Community - Development • Grant' Program-'(Program) to* the 
Lackawanna Community Development Corporation (Corporation).— 
On December 15, 1980, the City's legislature adopted a resolu-
tion in which it agreed to enter into a contract with the 
Corporation pursuant to which the Corporation would become 
managing agent of the Program. In January the City employees who 
had worked on the Program were, notified of the anticipated change. 
No official notice was given to AFSCME until March 10, 1981. 
AFSCME then sought, and the City agreed to, negotiations on the 
—Other specifications of the charge and of a related charge 
(U-5235), which was simultaneously heard at a consolidated 
hearing, including an allegation that the City had refused to 
negotiate the impact of the subcontract, were either dismissed 
by the hearing officer or withdrawn by AFSCME!'••'•-AFSCME has -;" '• "' 
not filed any. exceptions to the dismissal of the other specifi-
cations -.of••..•its. charges 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO...IT-5372 
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impact of the change. The City entered into a binding contract 
with the Corporation on April 10, 1981, and the affected positions 
were eliminated by the City effective April 12, 1981. Three of the 
four terminated employees were then hired by the Corporation to 
perform the same functions that they had performed for the City. 
In its brief to the hearing officer, the City had argued that 
f^ee^ drei3^ s-t0n=tre—erentraret^ 0-
tive. Relying upon Saratoga Springs CSD, 11 PERB 1(3037 (1978), 
aff'd Saratoga Springs CSD v. PERB, 68 AD2d 202 (3d Dept., 1979), 
12 PERB 1(7008, aff'd 47 NY2d 711 (1979), 12 PERB 1(7012, the hearing 
officer properly rejected this argument. The City does not repeat 
this argument before us. It now argues that the affected employees 
had not been in the unit represented by the union on December 15, 
1980, the date when it reached the decision to subcontract the 
work. This is based upon allegations of fact that are not in the 
2/ 
record.— According to the City, they did not become unit 
employees until January 1, 1981. Therefore, it argues.that it was 
not obligated to negotiate the subject of subcontracting on 
December 15 because the subcontract did not involve unit work at 
27 —: ; 
—The City states in its brief: 
"The record in this proceeding fails to reveal one very 
salient fact, which obviously was not considered by the 
Hearing Officer. . . . 
[T]he City would be hard pressed to argue against the 
Hearing Officer's decision if these affected employees 
had been members of the AFSCME prior-to the adoption of 
the resolution by the Council on December 15, 1980. 
However, by virtue of the fact that these employees 
did not become members of the bargaining unit until a 
date subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, it is 
respectfully submitted that the City of Lackawanna had 
no obligation to negotiate with AFSCME regarding the 
impact of its basic decision to subcontract the program.' 
Board - U-5372 -; 
that time. Even if the City may be heard to raise thrs argument 
at this time, we would find no merit in it. The additional 
evidence submitted by the City makes it cl ear that at least three 
of the four affected employees were in the unit by January 1, 
3/ 1981.— On that date the City became obligated to negotiate with 
AFSCME about the subject of subcontracting the work performed by 
^-e&e—emp^oy^ 
tract with''the corporation until after January 1, 1981, it violated 
its duty to negotiate with AFSCME about its decision to sub-
- • -
 4 / contract.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer and 
WE ORDER the City of Lackawanna to 
1. Offer reinstatement under their prior terms and 
conditions of employment to those employees who were 
in the negotiating unit represented by AFSCME on 
April 10, 1981 and were terminated as a result of 
the April 10, 1981 agreement between the City and 
the Corporation, together with any losses of wages 
or benefits that they may have suffered by reason 
of such agreement, and 
3/ 
—The record does not show when, if ever, the fourth employee, 
Maloney, was in the unit. 
—• O-JL-, ueer farK J^bu, m- I^KJS ifjuzo ^lyoi; . 
Board - U-5372 
2. Negotiate in good faith with AFSCME concerning 
terms and conditions of employment. 
DATED: February 11, 1982 
Albany, New York 
arold R.Newman,Chairman 
^ /W 
Ida Klaus, Member 
7 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WYANDANCH TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law.. 
#2D-2/12/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0187 
ROBERT ~DT~CtEARFTELD7-ESqT--for~Respondent : 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ. (RICHARD A. CURRERI, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
PACKMAN, OSHRIN AND BLOCK, ESQS. (ALAN D. 
OSHRIN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
On March 6, 1980, Counsel to the Public Employment Relations 
Board (Counsel) charged the Wyandanch Teachers Association 
(Association) with violating §210.1 of the Taylor Law by engaging 
in a 41-day strike between September 17 and November 16, 1979 
against the Wyandanch Union Free School District (Employer). At 
the hearing which was held on July 1, 1980, January 27, 1981 
and February 26, 1981, the Association conceded that it engaged 
in the 41-day strike as charged, but it alleged that its 
responsibility for the strike was diminished by acts of extreme 
provocation attributable to the employer. The allegation was 
rejected by the hearing officer.— The matter now comes to us on 
the report and recommendations of the hearing officer and the 
exceptions of the Association. In its exceptions, it argues that 
the hearing officer denied it a sufficient opportunity to prove 
extreme provocation. 
1/ In her report and recommendations, the hearing officer also 
made findings regarding the impact of the strike and the 
financial resources of the Association. There were no 
exceptions to any of these findings. 
^ Board - D-0187 -2 
Counsel completed its case- on January 27, 1981. At that 
point, the Association sought to call the attorney for the Employ-
er, who is also the Employer's negotiator, as its own witness. 
The hearing officer did not permit the Association to do so at 
that time on the ground that the Employer's attorney had no 
advance notice that he would be called as a witness and, therefore, 
did not have an opportunity to bring an attorney to represent him. 
The hearing was, therefore, adjourned until February 26, 1981, at 
which time the Employer's attorney testified pursuant to subpoena. 
Before adjourning the hearing on January 27, the hearing 
officer gave the Association an opportunity to call its other 
witnesses. The Association declined to do so on the ground that 
its strategy required the testimony of the Employer's attorney to 
be heard first. After the Employer's attorney completed his 
testimony on February 26, the Association sought to call witnesses 
who had been available on January 27, but the hearing officer did 
not permit it to do so because it had not availed itself of the 
earlier opportunity. 
Ordinarily a hearing officer may control the order of proof 
to be submitted at a hearing. Here, however, we conclude that the 
Association may have been prejudiced because the hearing 
officer did not advise the Association in clear and unambiguous 
terms on January 27 that, if it did not call its other witnesses, 
it would be precluded from calling them on a later date. 
) 
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ACCORDINGLY, WE REMAND this matter to the hearing officer 
to permit the Association to call the witnesses 
it sought to present on February 26, 1981, and 
to issue a further report and recommendation. 
DATED: February 10, J.982 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<^U AAU**. 
Ida Klaus., Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e ' M a t t e r of : #2E-2/12/82 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS, CITY ; 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
: BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent, 
^and-
; CASE NO. U-4859 
^^ WQT-^ -^ tQT-HfiT-KTWy . --: — — — - — — — --
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JAMES C. MEAGHER, 
ESQ; AND RICHARD Er CASAGRANDE, Esq., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ARNOLD ROTHSTEIN, ^ p^o se 
This matter .comes to us on the.exceptions of the Professional 
Staff Congress, City University of New York (PSC) to a hearing 
officer's decision that it violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law 
by not furnishing Arnold Rothsteih, a unit employee who pays PSC 
an agency shop fee, with financial information explaining its 
determination of the amount it refunded to him for the 1978-79 
fiscal year at the time when it provided the refund.— Among 
other things, the remedial order of the hearing officer requires 
PSC to refund all agency shop fee monies deducted from Rothstein's 
salary during the 1978^ -79 fiscal year with interest at the rate 
of six percent per annum and to amend its refund procedure within 
30 days or forfeit its right to agency shop fees. 
^1/ The hearing officer's decision also dealt with case U-4860 in 
which Rothstein charged PSC with refunding an insufficient 
amount of money. The hearing officer dismissed the charge 
pursuant to the authority of Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 
,14 PERB 1i3018.. Rothstein took" no exception to that part of 
the decision. 
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PSC specifies six bases for its exceptions: (1) This Board 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (2) PSC was not obligated to 
provide financial information to Rothstein explaining its deter-
mination of the amount of the refund, because Rothstein never 
requested such information. (3) Rothstein was not entitled to 
u^eh-^ n#o7rma-t^ i©^ ^^ ^ 
utilize the union's appellate procedures. (4) The filing of the 
charge herein was premature in that Rothstein should have 
exhausted the internal appellate procedures offered by PSC before 
being permitted to file the charge. (5) The order of the hearing 
officer requiring PSC :to refund Rothstein's agency shop fees plus 
interest thereon is unwarranted. (6) The order of the hearing 
officer requiring PSC to amend its refund procedure is unwarranted. 
We have dealt with most of the issues raised by the excep-
tions in UUP ((Barry) , 13 PERB 113090 (1980), affirmed UUP v.. Newman,. 
App. Div. 2d (3rd Dept., 1982), 15 PERB T7001. In that case 
too we asserted jurisdiction over a charge that a union did not 
inform a person paying an agency shop fee of the basis for its 
determination as to the amount of the refund. The allegation that 
we lacked jurisdiction was expressly rejected by the Appellate 
Division. 
While the charging party in UUP (Barry) had requested itemized 
financial information explaining the refund, our order directed 
the union to furnish all individuals who apply for and receive 
refunds, and not just those who requested it, an itemized audited 
statement of the basis of its determination of the amount of the 
7330 
Board - U-4859 -3 
'"! refund. That order proceeded from the premise that a union's 
duty to furnish.information flows, not from a request for informa-
tion, but from its statutory duty to provide the refund. In our 
view, the statutory obligation to make a refund necessarily carries 
with it the simultaneous companion duty to explain how the amount 
of the refund was determined. 
The third and fourth bases of PSC's exceptions both presume 
that a person receiving an agency shop fee refund must exhaust the 
appellate procedures offered by a union before the conduct of the 
union may be challenged in an administrative or judicial tribunal. 
We have already held in UUP (Barry) that the exhaustion of a 
union's internal appellate procedures is not a prerequisite to the 
filing of an improper practice charge alleging that requisite 
' financial information has not been furnished. We now hold that 
whether or not an individual receiving an agency shop fee refund 
intends to utilize the union's internal appellate procedure to 
challenge the amount of the refund has no.bearing on his right 
to receive financial information explaining the amount of the • 
refund. 
We agree with PSC that the hearing officer should not have 
ordered it to refund all agency shop fees paid by Roths tein durin.p; 
the 1978-79 fiscal year. We did not impose such an obligation in 
• UUP (Barry). The hearing officer reasoned that a remedy which 
went beyond the one provided by us in UUP (Barry) was appropriate 
here because the violation herein took place after the hearing 
officer's decision in UUP (Barry) and other similar cases. Thus, 
) 
according to the hearing officer, PSC was on notice of what was 
Board - U-4859 -4 
required of it, and its violation was, therefore, more serious 
than that of the union in UUP (Barry). PSC correctly points out, 
however, that no decision of this Board had been issued on the 
particular question presented here as of the' time when'.lit furnished 
the refund to Rothstein without providing him with the financial 
information. 
In Westbury Teachers Association, 14 PERB If3063 (1981), a 
union violated an obligation first made clear in our UUP (Barry) 
decision after the violation in question occurred. We rejected 
the hearing officer's order that the right of the union in that 
case to collect agency shop fees be suspended immediately, and 
ordered instead that the suspension be conditioned upon the union's 
not providing charging party with the requisite financial informa-
tion within 30 days of our decision. The same order is appropriate 
in the instant case. 
Finally, we agree with PSC that the hearing officer should 
not have ordered it to amend its refund procedure. In Middle 
Country Teachers Association, 15 PERB. 113004 (1982), we determined 
that it is unnecessary for a union'to amend its agency shop fee 
refund procedure to accord with our f inding" because; .our order 
directly imposes ; upon -the union the. •requisite refund procedures. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the PSC: 
1. Within 30: days to.furnish Arnold Rothstein 
with an itemized,' audited statement of -its receipts •" 
and disbursements and those-of any of its '-/; 
affiliates receiving any portion of their 
revenues from the Professional Staff 
7338 
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Congress' agency shop fees or dues, such 
statement to indicate the basis of the 
determination of the amount of refund, 
including identification of those disburse-
ments of the PSC or its affiliates . .' :..•-..:.• 
that are refundable and those that are not. 
~Should~~it~fail to do so, it shall 
a. cease and desist from collecting any 
agency shop fees from him until such time 
as it furnishes such a statement, and 
b. return to him all agency shop fee monies 
deducted from his salary during the 
1978^79 fiscal year with interest at the 
rate of six percent per annum from the 
date of each deduction. 
At the time of any future refund or notice 
that .a refund will not be made, to furnish to 
all objectors an itemized, audited statement 
of its receipts and expenditures and those of 
any of its affiliates which receive, either 
directly or indirectly, any portion of its 
revenues from agency fees, together with the 
basis of its determination of the amount of 
the refund, including identification of 
those disbursements determined by it and its 
affiliates to be refundable and those deter-
mined not to be refundable. 
Board - U-4859 
3. To post a copy of the notice attached hereto 
on all bulletin boards regularly used by it 
to communicate with unit employees .. 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus, Member 
u< 
David C. Randies ," Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT^RELATIONSBOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w e hereby notify a 1 1 unit employees that: 
We will, at the time of making all future refunds to 
agency fee payers, furnish to such persons, together 
with those refunds, an itemized, audited statement of 
the Professional Staff Congress1 receipts and disburse-
ments and those of its affiliates receiving any portion 
of their revenues from agency fees or dues, such state-
ment to indicate the basis of the determination of the 
amount of refund, including identification of those 
disbursements of the Professional Staff Congress and its 
affiliates that are refundable and those that are not. 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS 
Employee' 'Organization 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. HMOOC 
iOOO 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE 
POLICE), 
Employer, 
-and-
FRATERNAL ORDER OF NEW YORK STATE 
TROOPERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- a n d -
#2F-2/12/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2297 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., for Employer 
SCHURR & BURNS, P.C. (RICHARD OWEN BURNS,-
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
HINMAN, STRAUB, PIGORS & MANNING, P.C. 
(BERNARD J. MALONE, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Intervenor 
This proceeding was commenced by the Fraternal Order of / 
New York State Troopers, Inc. (Fraternal Order) which filed a 
petition to represent an existing unit of troopers employed by 
the Division of State Police of the State of New York (State). 
The petition was opposed by the Police Benevolent Association of 
the New York State Police, Inc. (PBA) which was the certified 
representative of the troopers. The matter now comes to us on the 
exceptions of PBA to the dismissal by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) of what 
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purport to be objections affecting the results of an election 
in which 983 troopers voted for representation by the Fraternal 
Order and 660 for PBA. The conduct complained about in PBA's 
objections concerns the showing of interest submitted by the 
Fraternal Order in support of its petition. 
The showing of interest accompanying the Fraternal Order's 
~pel:TFibir"^ 61^  
ship listing of unit employees who had authorized the State to 
deduct dues on behalf of the Fraternal Order. The individual 
authorization cards alone were hot numerically sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of a 30 percent showing of interest and 
PBA asserted that the evidence of current membership in the 
Fraternal Order as represented by the dues deduction authoriza-
tions should not be considered by the Director. 
The basis of the objection to the consideration of the 
dues deduction authorizations was an agreement -entered into by 
representatives of the Fraternal Order and PBA on November 6, 
1980. By that agreement, PBA consented to the State's 
deducting membership dues and insurance premiums on behalf of 
the Fraternal Order in return for the Fraternal Order's promise 
that, if it were certified, it would permit the State to continue 
to deduct dues and insurance premiums on behalf of PBA. A 
further condition for PBA's consent to the deductions was that 
the Fraternal Order would not use its membership lists as a basis 
for'supporting any challenge to the representation rights of PBA. 
1W 
Board - C-2297 , -3 
According to PBA, the Fraternal Order's commitment not to 
use its membership lists as part of a showing of interest pre-
cluded the Director from considering those lists for that purpose. 
The Director rejected this contention on the ground that PERB 
was not a party to' the agreement between PBA and the Fraternal 
Order and was not bound by it. He was, therefore, obliged to 
apply §201.4 of- the Rules of this Board which specifies that 
evidence of current membership is acceptable proof of a showing 
of interest."'-' He directed the holding of the election which 
was won by the Fraternal Order. PBA then filed the objections 
to the conduct affecting the results of the election which are 
the basis of the exceptions before us. As those objections 
merely allege that the Fraternal Order breached its agreement 
with PBA of November 6, 1980, by submitting its membership lists 
as part of its showing of interest, the Director dismissed 
them on the ground that he had already ruled on the matter. 
-.I/- PBA also brought a proceeding under CPLR Article 78 to 
enjoin this Board from processing the petition because 
the Fraternal Order had submitted", an improper showing 
of interest. The proceeding was dismissed on the ground 
that the relief sought was judicial review of a prelim-
inary determination made by PERB in the course of a 
reoresentation proceeding and was, therefore, premature. 
PBA v. Fraternal Order and PERB, 14 PERB 1[7 024 (Sup. 
Ct. Alb. Co. , 1981) .; \ 
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PBA's exceptions are directed to a determination of the 
Director that the Fraternal Order's showing of interest was 
sufficient. It argues that we should reject the Director's 
? / 
determination notwithstanding Section 201.4(c) of our Rules.-' 
In support of this argument it contends that the Director's error 
in accepting the showing of interest is that it was insufficient 
as a matter of lav? rather than numerically insufficient and that 
only a determination that a showing of interest is numerically 
sufficient is a ministerial act which is not reviewed by this 
Board. 
We do not agree with the distinction made by PBA. A similar 
situation was presented to us in1-' Yonker's- GSD, 10 PERB 1(3100 (1977). 
There, the incumbent union alleged that the petitioner solicited 
its showing of interest in violation of agreed upon access rules, 
and it argued that the showing of interest was, therefore, 
insufficient as a matter of law. 'The Director rejected the incum-
bent ';s argument, and we refused to consider the matter when the 
incumbent brought it to us by its exceptions. We based our 
refusal upon Rule 201.4(c) and the policy underlying that Rule. 
Articulating that policy we said: ,J... :.•:. •; :::/-•.-.; .'.:..'.: • ,v, • '.•._••. 
'".: '
;
 ".'i:•:.: ::-.••-:•; "The:•requirement- of a' showing: of interest .,-: ......v.,- ;.,.= 
is to permit this Board to screen out 
"i'".-•. ':' i~:rcr- those cases in which' there- is ..no- showing ; :....; :-y:.-"..-. 
of a substantial support of the petitioner 
':::.''••. :' •;•'•' "j'."by the- employees ,' so' thati-publicwfunds will b^ 
not be needlessly expended in the investi-
-
;
 • •'" "'•
:
 -
,
-"- '-gatioh"- and processing'- of. those "cas.es .". .It. : :.:::'.•?••; : 
2/ Section 201.4(c) provides: !'[T]he;.deterrainatiQii.; by the Director 
as to the timeliness of a showing of interest and of its 
numerical sufficiency is a ministerial act and will not 
be reviewed by the Board." 
7339 
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is not designed to Protect an incumbent 
-5 
3/ 
'. ". , ".'•. employee:, organization V-,' . M. •'. 
We-find .that, policy applicable here. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be; 
and they hereby are, DISMISSED. 
DATED; February 12, 1982 
——-——Albany-,—New _Yoxk^ .._ --
JC* /&* xg+0**v4<>*y 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus , Member 
3/ Even if we were to review the Director's ruling on the 
showing of interest, we would affirm that ruling because 
Section 201,4(b) of our Rules requires the Director to 
consider evidence of current membership as proof of a 
showing of interest.:.:..lakelancT. CSDv 12 PERB . If3017 (1979) 
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STATE OF NEW YORT" 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIL 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
STATE OF NEW YORK ( D I V I S I O N OF;STATE POLICE), 
E m p l o y e r , 
- a n d •-
FRATERNAL ORDER OF NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC. , 
. P e t i t i o n e r , 
- and 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE NEW 
YORK STATE POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor, 
BOARD 
#3A-2/12/82. 
C a s e N o . C - 2 2 9 7 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in "accordance 
with-the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing, that a negotiating repre- • 
sentative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that ' . 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC. . 
ha.s been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of. 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Troopers . . . 
Excluded: A 1 1 o t n e r employees 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that'the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with ' 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of' employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the • 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. . 
Signed on the 12th day of February, 1982. 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman-
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIC BOARD 
.In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF EAST AURORA, 
- and -
Employer, 
EAST AURORA QUAKER CLUB POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
#3B-2/12/82 
Case No. C-2316 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
"-"" : A~Tepre"S"ent"a'ti~°n^xo"CB~e^^^ — : 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected,' 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the East Aurora Quaker Club " 
Police Benevolent Association . •r 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the' 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances 
Unit: Included: All probationary patrolmen, patrolmen and 
lieutenants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Captains and' all other 
employees of the Village. 
?ERB 58.3 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that.the above named public employer 
shall negotiate^collectively with the East Aurora Quaker Club 
Police Benevolent Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and . conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10th day of February , 19 8 2 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
7342 David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK--.. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATK ". BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, . 
Employer, 
-and-
TERMINAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL 832, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner. 
#30-2/12/82 
Case No. C-2336 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
—^--^A^represen±"air±OTi^xo~ceed±n"g~h^viTTg~b"een"~con'dxicte'd~±n~ith"e—:—^~ 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board,.and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested .in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS. HEREBY CERTIFIED that Terminal Employees Local 832, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by thex 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the' settlement of 
grievances. . 
Unit: . Included: All full-time senior buyers, buyers 
and assistant buyers. 
Excluded: Supervising buyers and-all other employees. 
Signed.on .the 10th day of February, 1982 
Albany, New York 
' PERB 5 8 .3 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that .the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Terminal Employees Local 832,. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. '^  
/ " 
<4z^e,f/2 /^.. 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Cha i rman 
I d a Klzfiis, Member 
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STATE OF .NEW YORJ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIL BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BETHPAGE WATER DISTRICT, 
-and-
Employer, 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
AFL-CIO, .. , 
Petitioner. 
#31^2/12/82 
Case No. C-2310 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO. NEGOTIATE 
PEPS 58.3 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Fublic Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, • . 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED-that Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's 
Association, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of ' 
grievances1. \ 
Unit: Included: cleric, business machine operator,, 
water servicer, meter reader, laborer. 
Excluded: superintendent, water service supervisor, 
and all.elected officials. 
.Further, IT IS ORDERED that'the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 342,, Long Island Public . 
Service Employees,- United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's 
Association, AFL-CIO 
and enter-into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and-conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the iO.thday of February, 1982 
Albany, New York • ' • 
4-c^^£^ ^ £ 2 ^ . 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORJ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIL..J BOARD 
PERB 58.3 
In the Matter of 
BINGHAMTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and' 
PLUMBERS AND PIPE FITTERS LOCAL UNION 112, 
Petitioner. 
#2E-2/12/82 
Case No. Q2289 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE' 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above-matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with'the Public Employees' Fair Employment. Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of' the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public. 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
" IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Plumbers and Pipe Fitters 
Local Union 112 
has been designated and.selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named'public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: maintenance mechanic and maintenance 
mechanic helper. 
Excluded: supervisor, senior maintenance mechanic 
and all other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that'the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Plumbers .and Pipe Fitters • 
Local Union 112 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed, on the 12th day of February,. 19 8 t-
Albany, New York 
Har'old R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Kl4iis, Member 
7345 David C. Rar fd les , Member^ 
